The issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation and the perverse effects of financial rewards for blood and/or organ donation has been recently revisited in the economic literature with limited consensus. As Titmuss (1970) famously pointed out, providing monetary incentives to blood donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to donate if a reward is involved -in addition to having the effect of reducing blood quality. In this paper we examine how favouring different types of incentives are related to the likelihood of donating blood by exploiting a large sample representative of the population of fifteen European countries in 2002 containing information on both donation and attitudes towards incentives. Our results show those who have donated are less likely to favour monetary rewards for blood donation but are more likely to favour non-monetary ones. This is consistent with the idea that while monetary rewards may crowd out blood donation, non-monetary rewards do not.
Introduction
There is increasing interest in the motivation of altruistic behaviour, not merely for the sake of exploring behavioural drives which go beyond classical axioms of self-interest to explain individual behaviour, but more recently as a means of correcting government interventions which are held to crowd out individual actions. For example, the current UK government has advocated the notion of a 'big society' which, although rather unclearly de…ned, appears to have altruistic behaviour as a central theme. While there is much loose-talk centred around the de…nition of this policy tool, there is a growing interest in whether such behaviour can be motivated through incentive mechanisms.
There has thus been interest in nudging behaviour towards pre-speci…ed outcomes such as tackling health inequalities, preventing ill-health, improving health outcomes and spreading information and good health advice (Department of Health, 2011) .
Possibly one of the most long-lasting and discussed examples of behaviour broadly consistent with this notion of core altruistic behaviour is individual blood donation. Individuals might undertake certain altruistic actions guided by an extrinsic motivation, including a 'warm-glow'or moral satisfaction. Blood donation has often been seen as a clear-cut example of 'altruism with non-monetary pay-o¤s' (Elster, 1990) .
Nevertheless, the issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation is yet to be agreed upon in the economic literature. Cooper and Culyer (1968) argue that competition and monetary incentives would be suitable to motivate donors but Titmuss (1970) famously points out that providing incentives to blood donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to donate if a reward is involved. Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) discuss this proposition and suggest that the e¤ects of price incentives can simply be added to those of altruistic donation, and hence if the price of blood is raised, the quantity o¤ered would increase 1 in accordance with a supply function. However, the question of the e¤ects of monetary incentives on altruistic behaviour has remained unanswered and the phenomenon discussed by Titmuss was coined as motivation crowd-out. Trying to answer the question of whether altruistic behaviour can be incentivised, Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) , and Benabou and Tirole (2006) point out that intrinsic motivation may go unnoticed if a payment is o¤ered.
In this paper, we explore whether …nancial and non-…nancial incentives are associated to willingness to donate when other observed and unobserved factors are controlled for. We answer this question by exploiting a large dataset representative of …fteen European countries containing information on both whether or not an individual has been a donor in the past and her preferences towards monetary and non-monetary compensation for blood donation. This information allows estimation of two recursive equation systems and exploration of the association of preferences for di¤erent types of rewards (attitudes) and the probability of being a donor.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of blood supply crowding out due to monetary incentives in all European countries. But, most importantly, we …nd no evidence of potential crowding out when non-monetary rewards are involved in most European countries. These results are robust to di¤erent speci…cations and are coherent with the idea that crowding out is a phenomenon linked to the introduction of a market based rationale for non-market decisions, and that socially motivated individuals remain willing to donate when non-monetary rewards are o¤ered.
Our results con…rm and generalise recent …ndings that monetary and non-monetary rewards may not crowd out donation as long as self-interest is removed from them (Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008; Macis, 2010a, 2010b) . The contribution of our present work to the extant literature is threefold. First, we use a large dataset representative of …fteen European countries containing both attitudes towards incentives for blood donation and past donation behaviour as opposed to smaller and/or experimental samples on donors only. Second, because of that, we can directly analyse the relationship of the respondents'preferences for monetary and non-monetary rewardswith the probability of being a donor. Further, by using a sample representative of …fteen countries, we can control for ethnic, cultural and institutional variations. Third, our results are consistent with the idea that altruistic behaviour can be incentivised as long as the rewards do not conceal the identity of the blood giver as a 'donor'.
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The next section provides some background on altruism and blood donation; section 3 describes our econometric model; section 4 discusses the results; and section 5 concludes.
Background
We …rst present some background on the motivation behind blood donation as an act of gift-giving and, more speci…cally, how it relates to di¤erent forms of socially motivated acts including altruism. We then discuss how the literature on blood donation addresses the question of providing incentives for altruistic behaviour.
Blood Donation and Social Motivation
Blood donation has been classi…ed as an act of 'collective gift-giving' (Mercier Ythier, 2006) . Donating blood is a pro-social act in the sense that donors incur individual costs in exchange for a collective bene…t and contributes to ensuring the blood supply system works well.
In economic terms, blood donation, as any other donation or charitable act, is an economic voluntary transfer that traditionally has not been motivated by market exchange. It implies some form of economic sacri…ce by the giver in exchange for the receivers'bene…t for which the giver expects no return. Moreover, since gift-giving individuals, or knights in the terminology of Le Grand (1997 Grand ( , 2003 , ought to care about the receivers'utility rather than their own pure self-interest, theoretically it is envisaged as an act immune to strategic behaviour of giving agents towards the givers (Kolm, 2000) . Nevertheless, some forms of altruistic behaviour take place partially as a result of a feeling of 'duty' towards others (Etzioni, 1988) , from the imitation of others'behaviours -especially of those individuals signalled as 'reference groups'; from a feeling of social or moral indebtedness having been or expecting to be on the receiving end on another occasion; or, even from identity driven self-interested motivations (e.g., to attain a feeling of being a good person) as we argue in this paper.
Empirically, most blood donors will give some altruistic reason for giving, often citing feelings of community attachment or some commitment to the common good as their motive (Healy, 2000) . The latter paves the way for the development of an identity as an altruist, which can be substantiated by a continuous act of blood donation or not. Hence, blood donation can be considered a manifestation of impure altruism, insofar as donors receive a direct moral satisfaction for their act beyond that attributable to having contributed to the collective bene…t. In that sense, Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) examine the type and timing of blood donations between new and established donors. They …nd no evidence that 0-negative donors (i.e., the universal blood group compatible with all blood types and hence more valuable for donation) donate more, suggesting no evidence of pure altruism. More precisely, in some forms of impure altruism such as blood donation agents are said to receive a warm-glow payo¤ by taking an action they believe to be virtuous (Andreoni, 1990 ).
More recently, Stutzer et al. (2011) provide evidence form a …eld experiment with the Swiss red cross suggesting that altruistic preferences can be induced by making individuals re ‡ect on the importance of contributing to a public good such as blood donation.
Blood Donation and Incentives
In his famous work, Titmuss (1971) reported evidence that nonmarket mechanisms for blood donation are not only ethically superior but also more e¢ cient. Indeed, according to Titmuss, hepatitis rates from blood transfusions signi…cantly decreased when the blood was donated rather than purchased. This was explained by the fact that donors who are not paid for blood have no incentive to hide an illness, which leads to a higher quality of blood in such systems. Moreover, a …nancial reimbursement for blood donation could induce those who are more 'in need'of money to oversupply, eliciting a 'new supply' from non-altruistic individuals, who are in turn likely to be less healthy. Reimbursement for blood would reduce the altruistic motivations behind individuals' blood donation behaviour, producing a decline in supply from those individuals, i.e. crowd-out. As mentioned, this seminal work prompted Arrow's (1972) and Solow's (1971) responses questioning the substitution of altruists by nonaltruists in line with Cooper and Culyer's (1968) arguments. Kessel (1974) added that market mechanisms could provide guarantees for blood quality if accompanied by screening techniques to ensure product accountability. Interestingly, Thorne (2000) argued that with more e¤ective exhortation, a donor system is capable of procuring more organs at lower costs than market procurement. More recently, Andreoni et al. (2008, p. 134) argued that 'having a personal identity as an altruist might necessarily precede altruistic acts'and that the use of monetary rewards would con ‡ict with such identity and hence have unintended e¤ect on individuals'altruistic motivations.
It is worth mentioning, albeit brie ‡y, that a string of theoretical papers discussing signalling models and crowding out have also touched upon the subject of donation.
These papers discuss how individuals engage in civic activities to signal altruism.
The introduction of monetary incentives may make signalling more di¢ cult and thus cause crowding out (Seabright, 2004; Benabou and Tirole, 2006) .
There are very few empirical tests of Titmuss'claim but there exists some literature about counter-productivity of monetary incentives for other situations Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) . Drawing Most of the empirical studies suggest that crowding out is speci…c of the particular settings individuals are in. Thus, we advocate that extrinsic motivation or rewards for blood donation may take di¤erent meanings within each country's di¤erent social norms, and hence we should expect di¤erential levels of crowding out by country.
Furthermore, not all rewards may crowd out an individual's identity as an altruist (or a donor).
For the purpose of motivating our empirical speci…cation, we conclude this section by suggesting that the e¤ect of monetary incentives on blood supply can be modeled by drawing on the concept of donor identity. Assume that blood donated enters an individual's utility function, U ( ), by two means: positively through the (warm glow) e¤ect that it has on her self-image or self-identity I(:) as a donor, a gift-giver or an altruist, and negatively as a direct consequence of the inconveniences associated with donating blood. Also, monetary incentives for blood donation, r(a), increase the income of the donor but a¤ect negatively the donor's self-image or self-identity ( @I @r 0). The individual maximizes utility:
such that self-image I is
subject to the budget constraint
where a is the intensity of blood donation, c is a composite commodity with price p, I is self-identity, D is a vector containing individual demographic characteristics and the individual social environment, E represents other environmental factors which include social norms, v is the wealth of the individual, and r(a) is the monetary incentive given for blood donation. The (rearranged) …rst-order condition for the 6 maximisation problem of this simpli…ed image caring individual is
Assuming concavity of utility function with respect to a, the …rst-order condition above illustrates how a negative e¤ect on self-identity from receiving a monetary reward for blood donation will decrease the optimal amount of donation. and , which we cannot establish a priori.
In the next section, we describe our dataset and later we explain our empirical approach to test whether monetary and nonmonetary incentives are negatively associated with blood donation.
Data and Sample
We use data from the 2002 Eurobarometer (58.2), a survey covering …fteen European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The survey contains information on socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, and health and attitudes towards risk. In particular, among other subjects, this issue of the Eurobarometer survey gathered information not only on blood donation but also on the respondents'views on blood and organ donation. We use the answers to the following questions:
The …rst question (Q59) is on blood donation and it is phrased as 'Have you In Figure 1 we plot the percentages of donors and non-donors who believe that e10, e25, and e100 should be given for blood donation. The graph shows negatively sloped o¤er curves for both donors and non-donors, i.e., the higher the price o¤ered, the less people chose it as the right answer. Most signi…cantly, the non-donors'curve appears to the right of that for the donors. Table 2 displays a further summary of responses to these key questions by the respondents'socio-demographic characteristics and by their choices with regards to monetary versus non-monetary rewards. We notice from column one that more males have donated blood than females have (forty-one versus thirty per cent). Also, those living in Nordic European countries are more likely to have given blood than those in Central Europe (thirty-six per cent versus thirty-…ve per cent), the latter being more likely to have donated blood than the Mediterranean countries (thirty-four per cent). Mediterranean individuals are in favour of monetary rewards for blood donation (six per cent as opposed to …fteen and twenty-…ve per cent), but on average they choose higher monetary rewards for donation -with an average of e52.77 as opposed to e23.78 and e28.29, respectively. These regional di¤erences with respect to attitudes towards rewards could be explained by the levels of income per capita and/or the levels of social capital and trust in the institutions, although a more re…ned multivariate analysis is required to explore the di¤erences behind these bivariate frequencies. show concern about what they are doing, fourteen per cent thought other people show little concern, forty-seven per cent felt that other people show some concern, and thirty-four per cent declared others showed a lot of concern.
In the next section, we describe our empirical approach to addressing the questions 9 of interest. is characterized by the structural equations for the corresponding latent variables (y 1 and y 2 ):
In equations (5) and (6), the error terms [u 1 ; u 2 ] 0 are assumed to be distributed as bivariate normal with zero means, unitary variances, and correlation 1 1;
the variances are assumed to be unitary because observed outcomes for y 1 and y 2 are both binary. Vectors x; z 1 ; and z 2 are observed individual traits such that x a¤ects both blood donation and reward, z 1 determines donation only, and z 2 determines reward only; together, these variables constitute the individual demographics (D) and environmental factors (E) which enter the utility function (equations (1) and (2)).
The reduced form equation system constitutes equation (6) and
where the composite error term u 1 = u 1 + u 2 , and the error vector (7) and (6), binary donation and reward are characterized by
To allow for the fact that countries from di¤erent regions may have very di¤erent ethnic, cultural and social backgrounds, di¤erent levels of social capital and trust in the institutions, as well as blood collection habits and infrastructures, we also estimate a model in which country dummy variables are interacted with latent reward (y 2 ) in equation (5). This amounts to making the coe¢ cient of the latent reward a function of regional dummy variables d with parameter vector :
To simplify notations, express the deterministic components on the right-hand sides of the reduced forms (7) and (6) 
where 1 = 2y 1 1 and 2 = 2y 2 1 are dichotomous indicators, 2 is the standard bivariate normal cumulative distribution function, and "all" indicates multiplication over all sample observations.
Identi…cation Strategy
Unique variables z 1 in the donation equation (5) and z 2 in the reward equation (6) serve to identify the model parameters (also see (7)).
Common explanatory variables for both processes (x) are age, gender, education, marital status and country of origin. As variables that explain the donation decision but not beliefs about rewards for blood donation (z 1 ), we include those related to individual health (self assessed health, having a long standing illness, exercise), the type of dwelling where the respondant lives as it may re ‡ect accessibility to blood donation infrastructure; whether the individual perceives donation to be safer or not than ten years ago; and whether or not the respondant feels concern from others - We present the results in the next section and discuss them in the following section.
Results
We …rst present estimates of the 'having donated blood' equation. Secondly, we provide country speci…c estimates of the coe¢ cient associated with being in favour of monetary rewards and of non-monetary rewards. and move on to speci…cations with an increasing number of controls. This is done to illustrate the robustness of the main coe¢ cients of interest.
For both models, when estimating the probability of having donated, the …rst speci…cation controls for self-assessed health, having a chronic illness, and gender; the second speci…cation adds age and level of education; the third includes marital status and the level of urbanisation (rural, village, urban) . The fourth speci…cation additionally controls for country of origin and, …nally, 'model e'adds to that the level of physical activity and the individual's perceived solidarity towards oneself, viz., perceived degree of concern from others. When estimating the likelihood of being in favour of a particular type of reward for blood donation, the …rst speci…cation controls for gender and income; the second incorporates employment status, age and education; the third adds marital status; and the fourth and …fth additionally control for country of origin. In sum, in the benchmark speci…cation, the blood donation equation identifying variables, z 1 , are those related to health, physical activity, belief that blood donation is safer, type of dwelling, and perceived concern from others. The variables that identify the rewards equation, z 2 , are income and employment status. The bottom panel of Table 4 contains estimates for the donation-non-monetary system. The …rst row shows the coe¢ cients associated with believing that nonmonetary rewards for blood donation should be provided in the equation explaining the probability of having donated blood in the di¤erent speci…cations (from left to right). The coe¢ cient is 0:052 and insigni…cant for the …rst speci…cation; it remains insigni…cant and around 0:05 for the next two speci…cations, which do not control for countries of origin. When countries of origin are incorporated in the fourth and …fth speci…cations, the coe¢ cient becomes about 0:3 and signi…cant at the 95 per cent level of con…dence. Although this coe¢ cient is not as robust as that associated with believing in monetary rewards, these estimates suggest that those in favour of non-monetary rewards are less likely to have donated blood. The estimates for our benchmark (last) model can be found in Table 5 . We brie ‡y summarize the most interesting and signi…cant results. Looking at the estimates for the recursive system 13 of donation and monetary rewards in Table 5 , we notice that, the use of the aforemen- Controlling for countries of origin has an important e¤ect on the coe¢ cients of interest. This is expected because of the di¤erent country-speci…c infrastructures for collecting blood, ethnicity, cultures and levels of social capital. For that reason, we estimate a modi…cation of the benchmark model above by interacting latent rewards with country dummy variables, as described in (9). Table 6 displays the country-speci…c coe¢ cients for the association between believing in (monetary and non-monetary) rewards for blood donation and actually having donated. The most remarkable conclusion from the country analysis is that all countries show a similar negative association between believing in monetary rewards and donation, and thus, monetary rewards for blood donation could potentially mean a crowd out of blood supply of similar magnitudes. The second notable …nding is that the positive coe¢ -cient of non-monetary reward obtained without the country dummy interactions does not hold for any country except for Austria, with a coe¢ cient of 0:348 which is signi…cant at the 99 per cent con…dence level. Most interestingly, for Italy and Sweden, the coe¢ cient is negative but only signi…cant at the 90 per cent con…dence level. For the remaining countries, the association is not signi…cant. In the next section we discuss these results and conclude.
6 Discussion and Conclusion non-monetary rewards could potentially be used to incentivise blood donation as this kind of rewards seems not to remove, in the terminology of Andreoni et al. (2008) , the warm-glow associated with blood giving. Our …ndings contribute interestingly to the existing body of literature using experimental results of Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) and Lacetera and Macis (2010b) ; and, the results of Lacetera and Macis (2010a) and Glynn et al. (2003) using donors'datasets. Our analysis further con…rms their …ndings by providing additional empirical evidence obtained using information on the preferences of both donors and non-donors.
We also …nd strong evidence of gender di¤erences. First of all, males are more likely to be donors, more likely to favour monetary rewards, but not more likely to be in favour of non-monetary rewards. As noted earlier, males may be more likely to be donors for physical reasons (e.g., higher body weight, absence of pregnancy and lactation period, and lower likelihood of being anaemic). Other explanations include the fact that some countries organise blood drives to factories and other places with a higher percentage of males -and even motivate very strongly those in the military service to give blood as is the case in Austria.
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Another remarkable …nding of this paper is that although we con…rm that country of origin is a very signi…cant source of variation, a more detailed analysis at the country level reveals that the association of favouring monetary rewards and blood donation is uniformly negative and very signi…cant across all countries. Nevertheless, the country coe¢ cients for the association between non-monetary rewards and blood donation is much more heterogeneous, with Austria showing a strongly positive and signi…cant sign but Italy and Sweden showing the opposite.
While this paper presents one of the …rst attempts at investigating the crowding out issue using large multi-country survey data from Europe containing not only observational data but also attitudinal information on donors and non-donors, a few caveats pertain. First, our data come from a cross sectional database which, while large and representative of …fteen European countries, imposes important restrictions on the interpretation of the results. Also, the de…nition of a donor in the data is very wide one and includes any person that has ever donated blood. Therefore, we can suitably measure donor identity but not intensity of blood donation as we cannot distinguish regular from non-regular donors. Further, our analysis seeks to establish associations between individual information related to 'beliefs'(being in favour of a type of reward for blood donation) with an 'act realisation'(having donated blood).
The hypothetical nature of the stated 'beliefs'may therefore weaken the argument we are trying to make. Finally, we choose to allow favouring of rewards to have a direct association with being a donor but not vice versa. While bad experiences donating blood could a¤ect beliefs about rewarding for blood donation (to compensate for pain, for instance), this seems implausible and statistical test during our preliminary analysis did not support the reverse causality of donation on beliefs (see footnote 2).
Our results suggest that altruistic actions may be incentivised as long as the incentives do not interfere with the self-identity/image of the individual as a donor.
Thus, to deal with blood shortages, policies geared towards the provision of nonmonetary incentives could be implemented. This is compatible with the notion of nudging behaviour to ful…l a wider social policy objective. That is, altruistic behaviour could be motivated by non-monetary means and thus nudge individuals to act in a manner that provides collective bene…t. 
